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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
Shaun Gallagher
Since the 1990s, debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science have come
under a heavy influence from research in embodied cognition, often informed
by phenomenological philosophy, pragmatism, developmental psychology, ani-
mal cognition, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. Embodied cognition itself
is a complex field of loosely related approaches that ideally seek a more coherent
integration of different elements. These approaches have sometimes been collec-
tively referred to as the 4Es, although over the past ten years the number four
has been added to, and other letters in the alphabet have been proposed. So,
not just ‘embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive’, but also ‘ecological,
emotive (affective), empathic, scaffolded, etc.’. These embodied (and more than
embodied) approaches have challenged the standard approaches that focus on
computational and proposition-heavy representational accounts. They push
towards radical reevaluations on a number of basic issues including social cogni-
tion, self, perception, action, and, perhaps the most basic issue in the philosophy
of mind: the very nature of mind. They likewise put pressure on questions that
involve understanding the role of the brain in cognition.
If minds are embodied (4Etc.) and relational, then what implications fol-
low for the way we think of minds? Participants at the 33rd annual Spindel
Conference, Models of the Mind, explored these questions by addressing issues
that concern notions of intentionality, representation, externalism, predictive
coding, and the causal or constitutive roles of affect and affordance, tools
and technologies with respect to consciousness and cognition. The confer-
ence provided a forum where representatives of different, dissenting, and
sometimes conflicting models in the phenomenology and philosophy of mind
were brought together to debate these issues.
Given that an ideal integration of interrelated models of the embodied
mind pushes toward a holistic conception of cognition, where motoric and
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environmental elements mix with affective, intersubjective, social, and cul-
tural elements to form a rich melange of explanatory factors, what would
this mean for empirical science? This type of holism challenges any attempt
to focus exclusively on any one element, or to exclude factors that are clearly,
or even ambiguously, part of the pattern that constitutes cognition. Any
attempt to focus simply on brain processes, for example, and to claim that
such processes hold the ultimate explanation of the mind, is simply ruled out.
Yet, to develop such a focus is precisely the task of neuroscientists. Moreover,
to do the empirical science (not only in the case of neuroscience, but in all of
the relevant sciences from psychology to anthropology) one requires controls,
and the notion of controls specifically rules out any possibility of including all
factors at once. The typical way to deal with this problem is to do many
experiments, including and excluding different factors in each experiment,
and then to carefully look across all of them before drawing any general
conclusions.
Two problems should be immediately apparent. How, within any particu-
lar science, does one go about integrating results of different experiments
with different controls (and perhaps different methods of gathering data)?
And, how does one do this across all the relevant but specialized sciences
with the aim of drawing the large holistic picture? Scientists within their own
disciplines deal with the first problem every day, and have developed techni-
ques to solve it. But solving it often requires that they frame their analysis
within a specific set of assumptions that are not always examined. Philosophi-
cal (conceptual) analysis, it is thought, can enter at this point to clarify basic
concepts and assumptions. It may be, however, that philosophy also has a
role to play in addressing the second problem – a more synthetic role of try-
ing to draw the large holistic picture. In some respects, this is precisely the
point where the embodied mind approaches come to put critical pressure on
empirical science. These embodied approaches seemingly insist on a holistic
conception of the mind, while science, in order to do what it does, insists on
controls that focus the research on a limited number of isolated elements that
can be studied within one specialized discipline.
The type of philosophy presented at the 33rd Annual Spindel Conference,
and partially presented in this special issue, is one that takes seriously and
draws from the empirical sciences of mind, but also maintains a critical ten-
sion between these sciences and a possible integration of the variety of ele-
ments that constitute the mind. At the same time, if we call this a critical
dialogue between philosophy and science, there was also a critical dialogue
going on among the proponents of the various embodied approaches. The
possible integration of enactive, ecological, extended, emotive, etc. concep-
tions of the mind remains a not yet accomplished ideal.
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